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Abstract—The proliferation of web applications has essentially
transformed modern browsers into small but powerful operating
systems. Upon visiting a website, user devices run implicitly
trusted script code, the execution of which is confined within
the browser to prevent any interference with the user’s system.
Recent JavaScript APIs, however, provide advanced capabilities
that not only enable feature-rich web applications, but also allow
attackers to perform malicious operations despite the confined
nature of JavaScript code execution.
In this paper, we demonstrate the powerful capabilities
that modern browser APIs provide to attackers by presenting
MarioNet: a framework that allows a remote malicious entity to
control a visitor’s browser and abuse its resources for unwanted
computation or harmful operations, such as cryptocurrency
mining, password-cracking, and DDoS. MarioNet relies solely on
already available HTML5 APIs, without requiring the installation
of any additional software. In contrast to previous browser-
based botnets, the persistence and stealthiness characteristics of
MarioNet allow the malicious computations to continue in the
background of the browser even after the user closes the window
or tab of the initial malicious website. We present the design,
implementation, and evaluation of a prototype system, MarioNet,
that is compatible with all major browsers, and discuss potential
defense strategies to counter the threat of such persistent in-
browser attacks. Our main goal is to raise awareness regarding
this new class of attacks, and inform the design of future browser
APIs so that they provide a more secure client-side environment
for web applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Our increasing reliance on the web has resulted in so-
phisticated browsing software that essentially behaves as an
integrated operating system for web applications. Indeed, con-
temporary browsers provide an abundance of APIs and sensors
(e.g., gyroscope, location, battery status) that can be easily
used by web applications through locally-running JavaScript
code. The constantly expanding JavaScript interfaces available
in modern browsers enable users to receive timely updates,
render interactive maps and 3D graphics, or even directly
connect to other browsers for peer-to-peer audio or video
communication (e.g., through WebRTC).
In the era of edge computing, these capabilities have
pushed a significant part of web application logic to the
endpoints. Web publishers transfer parts of the critical com-
putations on the user side, thus minimizing latency, providing
satisfactory user experience and usability, while at the same
time increasing the scalability of the provided service. Despite
all these advancements, the web largely works in the very same
way since its initial inception: whenever a user visits a website,
the browser requests from the remote web server (and typically
from other third-party servers) all the necessary components
(e.g., HTML, CCS, JavaScript, and image files), executes any
script code received, and renders the website locally. Thus,
whenever a user browses to a website, the browser blindly
executes any received JavaScript code on the user’s machine.
From a security perspective, a fundamental problem of web
applications is that by default their publisher is considered as
trusted, and thus allowed to run JavaScript code (even from
third parties) on the user side without any restrictions (as
long as it is allowed by the site’s content security policy, if
any). More importantly, users remain oblivious about the actual
operations performed by this code. This problem has became
evident lately with the widespread surreptitious deployment
of cryptocurrency mining scripts in thousands of websites,
exploiting the visitors’ browsers without their consent [32],
[83]. Although there are some blacklist-based extensions and
tools that can protect users to some extent, such as Google’s
safe browsing [34], these do not offer complete protection.
On the other hand, disabling entirely the execution of
JavaScript code often breaks intended legitimate functionality
and affects the overall user experience. In general, the highly
dynamic nature of JavaScript, the lack of mechanisms for
informing users about the implemented functionality, and the
instant execution of script code, which does not leave room
for extensive security checks before invocation, are facilitators
for malicious or unwanted in-browser code execution.
On the positive side, unwanted JavaScript execution so far
has been constrained chronologically to the lifetime of the
browser window or tab that rendered the compromised or ma-
licious website. Consequently, cryptocurrency mining or other
malicious JavaScript code can affect users only temporarily,
typically for just a few minutes [70], depending on the time a
user spends on a given website. Unfortunately, however, some
recently introduced web technologies—already supported by
most popular browsers—can severely exacerbate the threat
of unwanted JavaScript computation in terms of stealthiness,
persistence, and scale, and the support of such capabilities has
already started raising concerns of the community [44], [45].
In this paper, we present MarioNet: a system that enables
a remote attacker to control users’ browsers and hijack device
resources. Upon visiting a website that employs MarioNet, the
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user’s browser joins a centrally orchestrated swarm that ex-
ploits user machines for unwanted computation, and launching
a wide variety of distributed network attacks. By leveraging
the technologies offered by HTML5, MarioNet goes beyond
existing approaches and demonstrates how malicious publish-
ers can launch persistent and stealthy attacks. This is possible
by allowing malicious actors to continue having control of
the victim’s browser even after the user browses away from a
malicious or infected website, and by bypassing most of the
existing in-browser detection mechanisms.
MarioNet consists of two main parts: (a) an in-browser
component, and (b) a remote command and control system.
Although MarioNet enables the attacker to perform attacks
similar to those carried out by typical botnets [49], there are
some fundamental differences. First and foremost, MarioNet
does not exploit any implementation flaw on the victim’s
system and does not require the installation of any software.
In contrast, MarioNet, leverages the provided capabilities of
JavaScript and relies on some already available HTML5 APIs.
Consequently, MarioNet is compatible with the vast majority
of both desktop and mobile browsers. In contrast to previous
approaches for browser hijacking (e.g., Puppetnets [15]), a key
feature of MarioNet is that it remains operational even after
the user browses away from the malicious web page.
In particular, our system fulfills three important objectives:
(i) isolation from the visited website, allowing fine-grained
control of the utilized resources; (ii) persistence, by continuing
its operation uninterruptedly on the background even after
closing the parent tab; and (iii) evasiveness, avoiding detection
by browser extensions that try to monitor web page activity
or outgoing communication. Besides malicious computation
some of the attacks the infected browsers can perform include
DDoS, darknet creation, and malicious file hosting and sharing.
In summary, in this paper, we make the following contri-
butions:
1) We present MarioNet: a novel multi-attack framework to
allow persistent and stealthy bot operation through web
browsers. MarioNet is based on an in-browser execution
environment that provides isolated execution, totally in-
dependent from any open browsing session (i.e., browser
tab). Therefore, it is able to withstand any tab crashes and
shutdowns, significantly increasing the attackers firepower
by more than an order of magnitude.
2) We demonstrate and assess the feasibility of our approach
by implementing a proof of concept prototype of Mari-
oNet for the most common web browsers (i.e., Chrome,
Firefox, Opera, and Safari). To measure its effectiveness,
we thoroughly evaluate MarioNet for various different
attack scenarios.
3) We discuss in detail various defense mechanisms that
can be applied as countermeasures against MarioNet-like
attacks.
The ultimate goal of this work is to raise awareness regarding
the powerful capabilities that modern browser APIs provide to
attackers, so that a more secure client-side environment can be
provided for web applications in the future.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we discuss about several features that have
been recently introduced as part of HTML5 and influence our
design. We also discuss about the capabilities of web browsers’
extensions, especially with regards to these HTML5 features,
and finally, for each feature, we analyze its security aspects,
access policies, permissions, and threat vectors that may open.
A. HTML5 features
1) Web Workers: Browsers typically have one thread that
is shared for both the execution of JavaScript and for page
rendering processing. As a result, page updates are blocked
while the JavaScript interpreter executes code, and vice versa.
In such cases browsers typically ask the user whether to kill
the unresponsive page or wait until the execution of such long-
running scripts is over. HTML5 solves this limitation with
the Web Workers API [1], which enables web applications to
spawn background workers for executing processing-intensive
code in separate threads from the browser window’s UI thread.
Since web workers run as separate threads, isolated from
the page’s window, they do not have access to the Dynamic
Object Model (DOM) of the web page, global variables, and
the parent object variables and functions. More specifically,
neither the web worker can access its parent object, nor the
parent object can access the web worker. Instead, web workers
communicate with each other and with their parent object via
message passing. Web workers continue to listen for messages
until the parent object terminates them, or until the user
navigates away from the main web page. Furthermore, there
are two types of web workers: dedicated and shared workers.
Dedicated web workers are alive as long as the parent web
page is alive, while shared web workers can communicate with
multiple web pages, and they cease to exist only when all the
connections to these web pages are closed.
Typically, web workers are suitable for tasks that require
computationally intensive processing in an asynchronous and
parallel fashion, such as parsing large volumes of data and
performing computations on arrays, processing images and
video, data compression, encryption etc. Indeed, during the
recent outbreak of web-based cryptocurrency mining, we have
observed that typically these scripts utilize web workers for
mining, and that they deploy multiple such workers to utilize
all available CPU cores of the user’s system.
2) Service Workers: Service workers are non-blocking (i.e.,
fully asynchronous) modules that reside in the user’s browser,
in between of the web page and the web server. Unlike
web workers, a service worker, once registered and activated,
can live and run in the background, without requiring the
user to continue browsing through the publisher’s website—
service workers run in a separate thread and their lifecycle
is completely independent from the parent page’s lifecycle.
The characteristics of service workers enable the provision of
functionality that cannot be implemented using web workers,
such as push notifications and background syncing with the
publisher. Furthermore, another core feature of service workers
is their ability to intercept and handle network requests, in-
cluding programmatically managing the caching of responses.
This allows service workers to be used as programmable
network proxies, allowing developers to enrich the offline user
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experience by controlling how network requests from a web
page are handled.
A service worker can be registered only over HTTPS via
the serviceWorkerContainer.register() function,
which takes as argument the URL of the remote JavaScript
file that contains the worker’s script. This URL is passed to
the internal browser’s engine and is fetched from there. For
security purposes, this JavaScript file can be fetched only from
the first-party domain (i.e., it cannot be hosted in a CDN or any
other third-party server). Also, no iframe or third-party script
can register its own service worker. Furthermore, importantly,
no browser extension or any in-browser entity can have access
either in the browser’s C++ implementation that handles the
retrieval and registration of the service worker or in the first-
party domain.
When the user browses away from a website, the service
worker of that website is typically paused by the browser; it is
then restarted and reactivated once the parent domain is visited
again. However, it is possible for the publisher of a website
to keep its service worker alive by implementing periodic
synchronization. It should be noted though that the registration
of a service worker is entirely non transparent to the user, as
the website does not require the user’s permission to register
and maintain a service worker. Furthermore, similarly to web
workers, service workers cannot access the DOM directly.
Instead, they communicate with their parent web pages by
responding to messages sent via the postMessage interface.
3) WebRTC: Popular web-based communication applica-
tions (e.g., Web Skype, Google Meet, Google Hangouts,
Amazon Chime, Facebook Messenger) nowadays are based on
Web Real-Time Communication (WebRTC) API [38], which
enables the establishment of peer-to-peer connections between
browsers. With WebRTC, browsers can perform real-time
audio and video communication and exchange data between
peers, without the need of any intermediary.
As in every peer-to-peer protocol, a challenge of WebRTC
is to locate and establish bidirectional network connections
with remote peers residing behind NAT. To address this,
WebRTC uses STUN (Session Traversal Utilities for NAT)
and TURN (Traversal Using Relays around NAT) servers for
resolving the network address of the remote peer and reliably
establishing a connection. There are several such servers pub-
licly available [36], maintained either by organizations (e.g.,
Universities) or companies (e.g., Google).
4) Cross-Origin Resource Sharing: Before HTML5, send-
ing AJAX requests to external domains was impossible due
to the restrictions of the same-origin policy, which restricts
scripts running as part of a page in accessing only the DOM
and resources of the same domain. This means that a web
application using AJAX APIs (i.e., XMLHttpRequest and
the Fetch API) can only request resources from the same
domain it was loaded.
However, the Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) [4]
capabilities introduced in HTML5, allow scripts to make cross-
origin AJAX requests to other domains. To enable this feature,
CORS uses extra HTTP headers to permit a user agent to
access selected resources from a server on a different domain
(origin) than the parent sits. Additionally, for HTTP request
methods that can cause side-effects on server-side data (in
particular, for HTTP methods other than GET, or for POST
usage with certain MIME types), the specification mandates
browsers to “preflight” the request, soliciting supported meth-
ods from the server with an HTTP OPTIONS request method,
to determine whether the actual request is safe to send [4].
B. Web Extensions
The current design of modern browsers’ extensions allows
two types of JavaScript scripts within a browser extension: (a)
content scripts and (b) background scripts. Content scripts [63]
run in the context of the websites visited by the user, thus they
can read and modify the content of these websites using the
standard DOM APIs [64], similarly to the websites’ scripts
(i.e., JavaScript scripts included by the publisher). Further-
more, content scripts can access directly a small subset of the
WebExtension JavaScript APIs [65].
On the other hand, background scripts run as long as the
browser is open (and the extension is enabled), and typically
implement functionalities independent from the lifetime of any
particular website or browser window, and maintain a long-
term state. These background scripts cannot access directly
the content of the websites visited by the user. However,
background scripts can access all the WebExtension JavaScript
APIs (or chrome.* APIs for Google Chrome), if the user’s
permission is granted during the installation of the extension.
Indicatively, the large set of WebExtension JavaScript APIs
contains the bookmarks, cookies, history and storage APIs,
which allow access on various types of user data, the tabs
and windows APIs, browserSettings and the webRequest API
among many others. A list of the available WebExtension APIs
and information regarding their support by major browsers can
be found in [62]. However, even though content scripts cannot
access all WebExtension APIs directly, and background scripts
cannot access the content of the visited website, this can be
achieved indirectly since the content and background scripts
of an extension can communicate with each other.
In addition to the above mentioned APIs, Google Chrome
also supports some HTML5 and other emerging APIs for its
extensions, such as audio, application cache, canvas, geoloca-
tion, local storage, notifications, video and web database [11].
However, it is important with regards to this work to emphasize
that none of the browsers allow extensions to use HTML5 APIs
such as the Service Workers or the Push API. Consequently,
browser extensions cannot interact with possible deployed
service workers in any way, (e.g., modify their code, monitor
their outgoing traffic, etc.).
C. Security Analysis
Table I summarizes the characteristics of different APIs
of interest. We categorize them along four axes related to the
efficiency of a distributed botnet: (i) the execution model (i.e.,
whether it can run in parallel to the main web page or in the
background), (ii) if direct network access is possible, (iii) the
ability to use persistent storage, and (iv) the ability to access
the DOM of the web page.
JavaScript code (running either as part of a web page, or
in a web worker or service worker) has access to persistent
storage (e.g., using WebStorage API [68]), as well as the ability
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TABLE I: Analysis of HTML5 JavaScript execution methods.
Feature ConcurrentExecution
Background
Execution
Webpage
Detached
Intercept
HTTP Requests
Persistent
Storage
DOM
Access
Network
Access
Local JavaScript code 3 3 3 3
Web Worker (Shared) 3 3 3
Web Worker (Dedicated) 3 3 3
Service Worker 3 3 3 3 3 3
to communicate with other servers or peers (e.g., using the
XHR [9], WebSockets [7], or WebRTC [6] APIs). However,
local JavaScript code embedded in the webpage also has direct
access to the page’s DOM and therefore, the ability to access
or manipulate any element of the webpage, as well as any
network request or response that is sent or received. Page-
resident JavaScript code cannot be detached from the webpage,
neither run without blocking the rendering process. This results
to a major limitation (for the purposes of malicious scripts),
as long-running operations would affect the user experience.
Also, a suspicious code snippet could be detected easily by
browser extensions, since it needs to be embedded in the main
website, and extensions’ JavaScript code can access, inspect
and in general, interfere with the content of the visited website.
Web workers, on the other hand, can perform resource-
intensive operations without affecting the user’s browsing ex-
perience, as they run in separate threads. This allows utilizing
all different available CPU cores of the user’s machine, by
spawning a sufficient number of web workers. Service workers
behave in a similar fashion, but have the important advantage
of being completely detached from the main web page, running
in the background even after the user has navigated away.
Moreover, service workers can intercept the HTTP requests
sent by the web page to the back-end web server. Importantly,
since service workers are completely detached from the page’s
window, extensions cannot monitor or interfere with them.
Finally, using the CORS capabilities of HTML5, it is possi-
ble to send multiple GET or POST requests to third-party web-
sites. However, the Access-Control-Allow-Origin:*
header has to be set by the server, in order for the request to
be able to fetch any content. Besides sending HTTP requests,
the WebRTC API [6] allows the peer-to-peer transfer of
arbitrary data, audio, or video—or any combination thereof.
This feature can open the window for malicious actions such
as illegal hosting and delivery of files, as well as anonymous
communication through a network of compromised browsers,
as we showcase later on.
III. THREAT MODEL AND OBJECTIVES
The motivation behind this work is to design a system
capable of turning users’ browsers into a multi-purpose “mari-
onette” controlled by a malicious remote entity. Our goal is to
leverage solely existing HTML5 features in order to highlight
the lack of adequate security controls in modern browsers that
would have prevented the abuse of these advanced features.
A. Threat Model
We assume a website that delivers malicious content to exe-
cute unwanted or malicious background operations in visitors’
browsers. Once the website is rendered, this malicious content
is loaded in a service worker that is capable of continuing its
operation even after the victim browses away from the website.
Websites can deliver such malicious or unwanted content
intentionally, to gain profit directly (e.g., by attracting visitors
and thus advertisers), or indirectly, by infecting as many user
browsers as possible to carry out distributed (malicious) com-
putations or mount large-scale attacks. There are also several
cases where a website can end up hosting malicious content
unintentionally. Those cases include: (i) the website registers
a benign service worker that includes untrusted dynamic third-
party scripts [52], which in turn possibly load malicious code;
(ii) the website includes third-party libraries1, one of which can
turn rogue or be compromised, and then divert the user to a
new tab (e.g., using popunders [37] or clickjacking [80]) where
it can register its own service worker bound to a third-party
domain; (iii) the website is compromised and attackers plant
their malicious JavaScript code directly into the page, thus
registering their malicious service worker — a scenario that
we see quite often in recent years [58], [53]; or (iv) the website
includes iframes with dynamic content, which are typically
auctioned at real-time [73] and loaded with content from third
parties.
In the latter case, malicious actors can use a variety of
methods (e.g., redirect scripts [43], [54] or social engineering)
to break out of the iframe and open a new tab on the user’s
browser for registering their own service worker. The important
advantage of this latter approach is that the user does not need
to re-visit the website for the service worker to be activated.
After registration, just an iframe loaded from the malicious
third party is enough to trigger the malicious service worker,
regardless of the visited first-party website. This relieves the
attackers from the burden of maintaining websites with content
attractive enough to lure a large number of visitors. Instead,
attackers can activate their bots just by running malvertising
campaigns, purchasing iframes in ad-auctions [84].
B. Challenges
The greatest challenge for systems like MarioNet is to keep
the user’s device under control for as long as possible. This
is a challenging task given that a connection with the server
may be possible only for the duration of a website visit; recent
studies have estimated the average duration of a typical website
visit to be less than one minute [70]. In addition, there is a
plethora of sophisticated browser extensions [35], [57], [81],
1Modern websites often include numerous third-party scripts [72], [26]
for analytics or user tracking purposes, aiming to gain insight, improve
performance, or collect user data for targeted advertising.
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Fig. 1: High level overview of MarioNet. The in-browser component (Servant), embedded in a Service Worker, gets delivered
together with the actual content of a website. After its registration on the user’s browser, it establishes a communication channel
with its remote command and control server (Pupeteer) to receive tasks.
[28], [10], [39] that monitor the incoming and outgoing traffic
of in-browser components. Consequently, another challenge for
MarioNet is to evade any such deployed countermeasure in-
stalled in the browser. Finally, it is apparent that the malicious
or unwanted computation of MarioNet must not impede the
normal execution of the browser, and avoid degrading the user
experience. Otherwise, the risk of being detected by a vigilant
user or at least raising suspicion due to reduced performance
is high.
To summarize, in order to overcome the above challenges,
a MarioNet-like system should have the following properties:
1) Isolation: the system’s operation must be independent
from a browsing session’s thread or process. This isolation
will allow a malicious actor to perform more heavyweight
computation without affecting the main functionality of
the browser.
2) Persistence: the operation must be completely detached
from any ephemeral browsing session, so that the browser
can remain under the attacker’s control for a period longer
than a short website visit.
3) Evasiveness: operations must be performed in a stealthy
way in order to remain undetected and keep the browser
infected as long as possible.
IV. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
In this section, we describe the design and implementation
of MarioNet, a multi-purpose web browser abuse infrastruc-
ture, and present in detail how we address the challenges
outlined earlier. Upon installation, MarioNet allows a mali-
cious actor to abuse computational power from users’ systems
through their browsers, and perform a variety of unwanted or
malicious activities. By maintaining an open connection with
the infected browser, the malicious actor can change the abuse
model at any time, instructing for instance an unsuspecting
user’s browser to switch from illicit file hosting to distributed
web-based cryptocurrency mining.
Our system, which is OS agnostic, assumes no assistance
from the user (e.g., there is no need to install any browser
extension). On the contrary, it assumes a “hostile” environment
with possibly more than one deployed anti-malware browser
extensions and anti-mining countermeasures. We also assume
that MarioNet targets off-the-shelf web browsers. Hence, the
execution environment of MarioNet is the JavaScript engine
of the user’s web browser. Breaking out of the JIT engine [16]
is beyond the scope of this paper.
A. System components
Figure 1 presents an overview of MarioNet, which consists
of three main components:
1) Distributor: a website under the attacker’s control (e.g.,
through the means discussed in Section III-A), which
delivers to users the MarioNet’s Servant component, along
with the regular content of the web page. It should be
noted that the attacker does not need to worry about the
time a user will spend on the website. It takes only one
visit to invoke MarioNet and run on the background as
long as the victim’s browser is open.
2) Servant: the in-browser component of MarioNet, embed-
ded in a service worker. It gets delivered and planted
inside the user’s web browser by the Distributor. Upon
deployment, the Servant establishes a connection with its
Puppeteer through which it sends heartbeats and receives
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the script of the malicious tasks it will perform. The Ser-
vant runs in a separate process and thereby it continues its
operation uninterruptedly even after its parent browsing
tab closes.
3) Puppeteer: the remote command and control component.
This component sends tasks to the Servant to be executed,
and orchestrates the performed malicious operations. The
Puppeteer is responsible for controlling the intensity of
resources utilization (CPU, memory, etc.) on the user side,
by tuning the computation rate of the planted Servant.
As illustrated in Figure 1, MarioNet is deployed in three
main steps: First, (step 1) the user visits the website (i.e., the
Distributor) to get content that they are interested in. The Dis-
tributor delivers the JavaScript code of the Servant along with
the rest of the webpage’s resources. During webpage rendering
(step 2), the Servant is deployed in the user’s browser. As part
of its initialization, the Servant establishes a communication
channel with its remote command and control server (Pupeteer)
and requests the initial set of tasks (step 3). The Pupeteer,
maintained by the attacker, responds with the malicious script
(e.g., DDoS, password cracking, cryptocurrency mining) the
Servant has to execute.
B. Detailed Design
MarioNet leverages existing components of HTML5 to
achieve the objectives presented in Section III: isolation,
persistence, and evasiveness. In-browser attacks that involve
computationally heavy workloads require isolation in order to
avoid interfering with a webpage’s core functionality. Previous
approaches [25], [71] rely on web workers [1] to carry out
heavy computation in the background (in a separate thread
from the user’s interface scripts). Although this isolation also
prevents the code of the web worker from having access to the
DOM of the parent page, it has the benefit of allowing multi-
core utilization. As a result, attackers can utilize simultane-
ously many cores for their malicious computations. However,
web workers run in the same browser tab as the website, and
consequently, their execution is tightly coupled with the parent
tab: whenever the tab closes, the web worker terminates as
well. In addition, security-related browser extensions can (i)
monitor all traffic and (ii) tamper with the script running in
the web worker.
To remedy these shortcomings, MarioNet leverages a dif-
ferent, relatively recent feature of HTML5, namely service
workers [31]. As described in Section II-A2, service workers
are typically used as an in-browser caching proxy, serving
the user during offline periods. In contrast to web workers,
service workers run in a separate process, completely detached
from the parent tab. In addition to service workers, we use
the SyncManager interface [60] to register background “sync
registrations” for the service worker, to keep the Servant
always alive. The tab independence and indefinite lifetime
properties of the Servant provide MarioNet with persistence,
allowing attackers to carry out their malicious computation for
the entire period that a browser remains open—a major benefit
over existing approaches based on web workers, which remain
operational only for the duration of a browsing session (open
tab).
Another advantage of leveraging service workers is that
they conceptually operate between the browser and the remote
server. As a consequence, any security monitoring performed
by additional browser extensions cannot monitor the activity
and network communication of the service worker, allowing
the Servant to operate in a stealthy way. Consequently, the Ser-
vant can establish a communication channel with the remote
Puppeteer that no browser extension can snoop. In addition,
the established communication channel is TLS-encrypted (as
required by the service worker API [33]). This way, the
integrity and the confidentiality of the transmitted data is en-
sured. Consequently the C&C communication channel cannot
be inspected by any eavesdropping third party sitting either (i)
inside (e.g., browser extension) or (ii) outside (e.g., ISP) of
the browser.
The only request that reveals the existence of the service
worker is the initial GET request at the time of the user’s first
website visit, when the service worker gets initially registered.
Although during that GET request a monitoring extension can
observe the contents of the service worker, it will still not
observe any suspicious code—the code that will carry out the
malicious tasks is delivered to the Servant only after its first
communication with the Puppeteer, and this communication is
hidden from browser extensions (as discussed in Section II-B)
Along with the evasiveness of MarioNet against monitoring
and blocking extensions, it is also important to maintain its
stealthiness to avoid detection from users themselves. Existing
web-based botnet approaches [25], [71] follow an opportunistic
approach, utilizing greedily all available resources on the de-
vice during their limited period of activity. When browsers run
such a malicious script, the louder noise of the fans, the sudden
power drainage, or the sluggish responsiveness of their system,
alerts users who are likely to close the associated browser tab,
or even report the website to their blocker extension.
In contrast to existing in-browser attacks, MarioNet aims to
prolong its presence on a user’s device by allowing the attacker
to monitor the state of the device, and adjust accordingly the
resources utilization in order not to raise any suspicion. To that
end, the periodic heartbeats sent from Servant to Puppeteer
also contain (i) the current CPU utilization of the device using
HTML5’s hardwareConcurrency API [2] and (ii) its current
battery status (“charging” or “on battery” and battery level)
using the Battery Status API [14]. Having this information,
the Puppeteer can reduce or pause the malicious workload,
and minimize the risk of self-exposure in case of a possible
CPU capping mechanism of the browser [20], [19].
Persistence across Browser Reboots: MarioNet runs in
the background as long as the browser is open. After that,
the victim has to re-visit the malicious domain or render the
malicious iframe where the malicious domain resides, in order
to re-activate the service worker and allow the Servant to
continue its operation.
To increase persistence even further, we have developed
a technique that allows MarioNet to persist even after the
browser has been restarted. This can be achieved by utilizing
the Push API [66]. This feature allows a web server to deliver
asynchronous notifications and updates to service workers, in
an attempt to provide users with better engagement and timely
new content. By abusing this mechanism, MarioNet can enable
the Puppeteer to periodically probe its Servants and re-activate
them after the browser restarts.
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Fig. 2: Different use cases of MarioNet. After victims get compromised, the attacker can instrument them to perform (a) visits
to a selected server or URL, for DDoS attack or fake ad-impressions, (b) requested computations, such as cryptocurrency mining
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In contrast to the non-transparent to user process of ser-
vice worker registration, security policies in modern browsers
restrict the use of the Push notifications feature only after the
user’s permission. Of course, some users may get suspicious
on that behavior, depending on the website they visit. However,
an advanced attacker can convince reluctant users to give
their consent for push notifications by advertising enticing
offers (e.g., virtual points or participation to contests) or by
performing more advanced types of social engineering using
custom permission requesting popups. Recent studies have
shown that 12% of users give such permissions when they are
asked to [13], which constitutes a fairly large number of nodes,
sufficient for deploying a persistent botnet that is capable to
survive browser reboots.
V. ATTACK VECTORS
Our design, described in Section IV, opens the space for
a diverse set of attacks in users’ web browsers, which can be
categorized in three models, as shown in Figure 2.
A. DDoS Attacks
A simple yet powerful attack that can be launched with the
devices the attacker controls is a Distributed Denial-of-Service
attack. In MarioNet we implemented a DDoS attack module
enabling the Puppeteer to instruct the Servants to connect to
a specific Internet host. As a result, the targeted host will get
overwhelmed by the large amount of connections and thus
become non-responsive to benign users.
A limitation of using a high-level language, such as
JavaScript, to initiate a DoS attack is that it does not pro-
vide low level networking access. Directly manipulating the
network packets to be sent is thus not an option (e.g., force
TCP-SYN packets only, or spoof source network address). In
addition, it results to much higher latency, due to the extra
memory copies and context switches that are caused from the
resulting system calls. Instead, JavaScript offers more high-
level approaches, such as XMLHttpRequest objects [9] or
methods provided by cross-platform libraries (e.g., the get(),
post(), and ajax() methods provided by jQuery). These
methods can be used to perform HTTP GET and POST
requests, either synchronously (i.e., in a blocking fashion, wait-
ing for the connection to be established) or asynchronously. In
addition, some methods may return cached responses (e.g., the
get() method provided by jQuery).
In order to increase the DDoS fire power of MarioNet,
we use the XMLHttpRequest API, which can be used
to perform AJAX (asynchronous HTTP) requests, and does
not cache any responses. Moreover, it allows to control the
request method, and set an arbitrary HTTP body, as well
as some HTTP request headers (e.g., the request content
type). One concern though, that we already mentioned in Sec-
tion II-A4, is that if the target web server does not enable the
Access-Control-Allow-Origin:* header, the request
will not fetch any content. Even in that case though, the attack
can still succeed, as it does not necessarily rely on forcing the
web server to send a response. As long as the requests are
sent, the incoming network link is filling up and also the server
needs to spend resources to handle the incoming requests.
Apart from HTTP fetching mechanisms, HTML5’s Web-
Sockets API [7] provide additional opportunities. WebSockets
can be used to send messages to a WebSocket-enabled server
over TCP and receive event-driven responses. Obviously, to
mount a DoS attack using WebSockets, the targeted server
needs to implement this protocol; this is indeed the case for
many popular web sites, as well as for smaller ones, which
increasingly adopt the WebSockets protocol. Besides that, as
already has been shown in [74], malicious JavaScript code may
still misuse the handshake by requesting resources even by
targeting a non-WebSocket web server. Although the targeted
web server may ignore the characteristic WebSocket HTTP
headers (as it is not supported), it can still accept WebSocket
handshake HTTP requests as normal HTTP requests [74]. As
a result, the web browser will start the WebSocket handshake
with the target, while the non-WebSocket web server will
process the HTTP request as a valid request. In MarioNet, we
use the WebSocket() method to initiate connections with
web servers, and then the send() method to send a flood of
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data to the targeted server.
Using XMLHttpRequest.send(), jQuery’s ajax()
and WebSocket’s send() methods, we can continuously send
a flood of messages to a targeted host. Each approach allows
MarioNet to connect to any host, by specifying the hostname
or IP address and the corresponding port number. By doing so,
JavaScript code can misuse the TCP handshake by requesting
connections even to non-HTTP or non-WebSocket servers. In
those cases, the targeted servers will either receive only the
TCP SYN packets (e.g., when the destination port is in a
closed, reject, or drop state), or the full HTTP request. Fur-
thermore, the WebSocket API allows to open many different
connections, which enables attackers to orchestrate different
styles of attacks (e.g., stealthy, low-volume, etc.). For instance,
it allows to perform Slowloris-like attacks, by keeping many
connections to the target server open as long as possible [21].
Of course, MarioNet cannot send messages to any port
at the targeted host. To avoid Cross-protocol Scripting [86],
which allowed the transmission of arbitrary data to any TCP
port, modern browsers block by default outgoing messages to
a list of reserved ports [61]. Finally, we note that the resulting
network performance of JavaScript is not that high, compared
to DoS attack tools that can leverage direct access to OS
internals (i.e., memory map techniques between the network
interface and the application) and low-level APIs (i.e., raw
sockets). However, this is not a serious limitation, as it has
been shown that short, low-volume DDoS attacks pose a great
security and availability threat to businesses [89].
B. Cryptocurrency Mining
The rise of lightweight cryptocurrencies, such as JSEcoin
and Monero, together with the features of Web Workers API
that have been described in Section II, have recently enabled
the widespread adoption of cryptocurrency mining on the Web.
As a result, attackers have started migrating mining algorithms
to JavaScript and embed them to regular websites, in the form
of web worker tasks. By doing so, the website visitors become
mining bots unwittingly every time they access these websites.
However, the short website visiting times make the prof-
itability of the web workers approach questionable [82]. In-
stead, MarioNet increases the potential profits of web cryp-
tocurrency mining, due to the background execution it offers,
completely detached from the website. As a matter of fact,
we have implemented a service worker module that computes
hashes of the popular CryptoNight algorithm [23]. CryptoNight
is a proof-of-work (PoW) algorithm used in several cryptocur-
rencies, such as Electroneum (ETN) and Monero (XMR). The
service worker that we have implemented within MarioNet,
connects with Coinhive [22], which is a web service that
provides an API for users to embed a JavaScript miner on their
websites. Alternatively, the cryptocurrency miner can connect
to any mining pools, through the HTTP stratum proxy, using
a registered account, as shown in previous works [71]. By
doing so, attackers will be credited the payout directly to their
wallets. Finally, we notice that other hash algorithms used in
for cryptocurrency mining, such as Scrypt-based miners [18],
can be implemented in a straightforward way, by porting their
implementations to JavaScript.
C. Distributed Password Cracking
The idea of distributed password hash cracking on the
web is not new [15]. Orthogonal to other approaches that
try to boost the sustained performance by either increasing
the parallelism using different web workers [25], or exploiting
the computational capabilities of modern GPUs using the We-
bGL/WebCL API [3], MarioNet can help towards increasing
the uptime of hash cracking techniques, and as a result the
overall performance.
The basic concept in MarioNet is to have the Puppeteer
distribute the computation between the infected browsers. The
server contains a list of the hashes to be cracked and gives
each node a range of character combinations along with the
hash to be cracked. Each node then hashes these combinations
and checks if it matches the original hash; if it matches, the
node reports the recovered password back to the Puppeteer. A
major advantage of MarioNet is that it can be agnostic to the
hashing function used, since the function code is transferred
from the Puppeteer and executed from the MarioNet nodes
through eval(). As a matter of fact, in Figure 7 we show the
performance achieved by MarioNet for executing two popular
hashing algorithms, namely SHA-256 and MD5.
D. Malicious or Illegal Data Hosting
Having a large network of MarioNet nodes can also enable
the delivery of illegal or otherwise unwelcome content. The
advantages of MarioNet is not only that the content can be
served by unsuspecting users, making it hard to track down the
real culprits behind it, but also allows efficient data distribution
between the MarioNet nodes.
Indeed, the release of WebRTC (Web Real-Time Communi-
cations) protocol in the browser a few years ago, enables peer-
to-peer networking communications. In particular, WebRTC
allows Web applications and sites to capture and optionally
stream audio and/or video media, as well as to exchange
arbitrary data between browsers without requiring an interme-
diary. Even though this technology opens new opportunities
for distributed networking to the web, it also brings some
significant security concerns when used maliciously. In the
case of MarioNet, for instance, it could be easily used as an
illegal content provider, leveraging the distributed nature and
persistence that offers. As a proof-of-concept, similar to [25]
we used the WebTorrent API [29] to implement a simple, yet
flexible, data hosting mechanism over WebRTC which allows
the sharing of torrent files through the infected MarioNet
nodes. WebTorrent allows users to seed and leech files with
other peers entirely through their web browsers. A new torrent
file can easily be created using the seed() function which
creates a new torrent and starts seeding it. The file can then
be downloaded and further seeded from other nodes, using the
returned magnetURI.
E. Other Attacks
1) Relay Proxies: Fully anonymous and transparent relay
proxies that can route data between two peers, are an important
asset for criminal use, making it difficult for the authorities to
track down the perpetrators. Large groups of such proxies can
form a hidden network (i.e., Darknet [88]), where people buy
and sell illicit products like weapons and drugs [24], [56].
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The MarioNet infrastructure can provide a platform for
establishing such networks. Specifically, an infected browser
can be used as an intermediate proxy to fetch illegal content
from services in the Darknet on behalf of an anonymous
user. Indeed, building upon the previous illegal data hosting
scenario, MarioNet could form anonymous circuits (similar to
mixnets), through which users could route their web traffic.
Such chain could be created by bots connected with encrypted
peer-to-peer channels with each other by using WebRTC2.
There are already such browser-based proxies implemented
over WebRTC, like Stanford’s Flash Proxies [30] and Tor
Project’s Snowflake [41]. Apparently, a solid implementation
of such a service within a service worker, capable of providing
strong anonymity guarantees (e.g., similar or close to Tor), is
not a trivial task and requires deeper analysis. Hence, such an
exploration is beyond the scope of this paper.
2) Click Fraud: Having a large botnet can become prof-
itable in many ways. One such way is to abuse the digital
advertising ecosystem, by having bots rather than humans view
or click on online advertisements. It is estimated that online
advertising fraud will cost advertisers $19 billion in 2018,
which represents 9% of total digital advertising spend [48].
MarioNet can be easily used to generate clicks, as well
as surf targeted websites for a period of time, stream online
videos to increase views, manipulate online polls, and possibly
sign up for newsletters. To achieve that, the service worker can
obtain periodically a list of online links that is requested to
visit, possibly combined with metadata such as visit duration,
number of clicks, etc. In addition, due to the rich programming
features that JavaScript offers, MarioNet can be easily pro-
grammed to follow a human-centric online behavioral model
(e.g., similar to the one proposed by Baldi et al. [17]) to evade
countermeasures that seek to block users with unusual activity
(e.g., clicking too many links in a short period of time).
VI. EVALUATION
A. Prototype Setup
To assess the feasibility and effectiveness of our approach,
and also to check the existence of possible code protection and
restriction mechanisms, we build a real world deployment of
our MarioNet prototype. Our prototype consists of two servers;
the first server is an Apache web server that hosts a simple
webpage, and the second one is a command and control server
(i.e., Puppeteer), delivering tasks to the Servants. Upon the first
website visit, the webpage registers a service worker in the
Servant and a sync manager that is responsible to keep the ser-
vice worker alive in the background. After its registration, the
Servant opens a full-duplex connection—using the WebSocket
API [7]—with the Puppeteer and retrieves a JavaScript code
snippet that executes through eval(). In order to be able to
use eval() from within the service worker, the collaborating
web server gives the needed permission through the HTTP
Content Security Policy (CSP).
Browser Compatibility: As discussed in Section IV, our
approach is based on existing components of HTML5 such
as Service Workers and its interface SyncManager. Table II
2WebRTC traffic is always encrypted. Transmitted data are protected
by Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [67] and Secure Real-time
Transport Protocol (SRTP) [59].
TABLE II: MarioNet’s browser compatibility
Device Browser SW compatibility
Desktop
Chrome since v40
Firefox since v44
Opera since v26
Edge since v17
Safari since v11.1
IE NoSupport
Mobile
Samsung Internet since v4
Chrome Android since v64
UC Browser since v11.8
iOS Safari since v11.3
Firefox Android since v57
Android Browser Partially since v62
Opera Mobile Partially since v37
Opera Mini NoSupport
Blackberry NoSupport
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Fig. 3: Rate of asynchronous outgoing HTTP OPTION re-
quests for different browsers and network connections in the
DDoS scenario. An orchestrated DoS attack in MarioNet can
achieve rates of up to 1632 reqs/sec per infected device.
summarizes the browser compatibility of these components,
and thus the compatibility of our framework. As we can see,
some vendors like Google, started supporting service workers
quite early (2016), while others caught up only until recently,
i.e., Safari (2018). Still, MarioNet is compatible with the most
popular browsers in both desktop and mobiles.
In our experiments we tested MarioNet with four popular
desktop browsers, namely Chrome, Firefox, Opera and Safari.
However, we chose to exclude Safari from the performance
evaluation results, due to its bad performance sustained in all
the experiments conducted. Even though the service worker
functionality is provided by Safari, we experienced several
performance glitches. We believe that this behavior is due to
the recently adaptation of service workers in Safari (2018).
Even for simple workloads, i.e., a simple counting example, the
performance achieved by the service worker is extremely slow
(i.e., 20− 50× lower) compared to the performance achieved
by the other three browsers.
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B. Performance Evaluation
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of MarioNet, we
conduct several experiments with various popular browsers
and hardware settings, which allow us to make useful and
interesting comparisons. However, it is noted that in this paper
we do not aim to provide an optimal implementation in terms
of performance, but rather to demonstrate the feasibility of
the aforementioned attacks. To that end, the performance of
the system can be further improved by using WebAssembly.
Furthermore, all the experiments presented in this section were
conducted in a controlled environment, without reaching any
host outside our local network (see Section VIII).
1) Abuse of network resources: In the first experiment,
we measure the rate of HTTP requests that the MarioNet
framework can achieve from a single browser. As described
in Section V-A, the Puppeteer instructs the Servant to con-
tinuously send multiple HTTP requests to a remote server,
via XMLHttpRequest.send(). Figure 3 shows the rate
achieved for different browsers and different types of networks.
To measure the rate, we ran tcpdump at the targeted server
and captured all the incoming HTTP traffic. As can be seen in
Figure 3, even devices over inferior network connections are
capable of contributing a fair share in such a distributed attack
(e.g., an average of 214 reqs/sec on Good3G networks). For
high network bandwidth, i.e., 1 GbE, Opera tends to achieve
higher rates (up to 1632 reqs/sec on average).
2) Abuse of computation power: The next experiment
explores the computation capacity that the infected browsers
can provide. Figure 4 presents the hashrate achieved when
mining Monero coins in Chrome, for different CPU models and
various utilization thresholds. As expected, the performance
gain is highly affected by the equipped hardware. Specifically,
we see that Intel i7-4790 can give 29% more hashes per second
than Intel i5-5200U, when fully utilized.
After experimenting with different operating systems, we
noticed that the different power mode characteristics they pro-
vide can drastically affect the sustained performance of Cryp-
toNight execution. Figure 5 shows the performance achieved
on a Windows 7 desktop computer that is equipped with an
Intel i7-4790K, at 4.0GHz, under 3 different power modes
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Fig. 7: Cracking speed of different browsers in the distributed
password-cracking scenario. MarioNet can brute-force per
victim around 500K MD5 hashes per second or around 300K
SHA-256 hashes, irrespective of the infected browser.
(namely High Performance, Balanced and Power Saver). When
fully utilized, the Power Saver mode forces the CPU to reduce
the voltage and clock speed, which causes a decrease of up to
78.41% compared to the High Performance mode. In addition,
in the Balanced mode, when CPU utilization exceeds 50% the
operating system allows the CPU to run in full speed in order
to cover the increased computation needs, thus verging the
hashrate of High Performance mode.
Next, we set out to explore how different infected browsers
affects the computation gain of MarioNet. Figure 6 shows
the hash-rate achieved for different browsers, when using a
Intel i7-5557U CPU. We observe that Firefox can calculate up
to 34.55% more hashes per second than Chrome and Opera,
which are both based on Chromium and the V8 JavaScript
engine [8].
In our last experiment, we explore the performance sus-
tained for password cracking. Figure 7 plots the achieved rate
for hashing 10-digit alphanumerical passwords on a brute-force
manner, for both MD5 and SHA-256 algorithms. As we can
see, all browsers achieve similar and comparable performance.
This means that a single browser can brute-force around 500K
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MD5 hashes per second or 300K SHA-256 hashes, irrespective
of the infected browser.
3) Persistent and Evasive abuse: In order to assess the
persistence and evasiveness of our approach, we deliver Mar-
ioNet within a webpage destined to perform cryptojacking.
Before fetching the webpage in a Chrome browser, (i) we
open tcpdump and (ii) we deploy in our browser the
following extensions/tools: Tamper Chrome HTTP capturing
extension [35], Chrome’s default DevTools, WebSniffer [12],
and HTTP Spy [5] to explore in the real world, the stealthiness
of MarioNet against state-of-the-art monitoring and blocking
extensions. After fully rendering the webpage and planting
the Servant, we close the associated browser tab. Then, from
the Puppeteer, (iii) we push a cryptocurrency mining task
to the Servant and let it run for 3 consecutive days. We
see that although the Servant regularly communicated with
the Puppeteer to obtain PoW tasks, as tcpdump correctly
captured, none of the employed extensions was able to monitor
any Servant-related traffic other than the very first GET request
of the webpage, right before infection.
Comparison to state-of-the-art web botnets: In order to
compare MarioNet with the state-of-the-art web-botnets, we
load our password cracking algorithm in a set of web workers
as described in related approaches [25], [71]. Given that these
web-botnets run only for as long as the victim is surfing
the webpage, they need to fully utilize the resources of the
infected device in order to scrounge a meaningful gain from
this short infection window. As a consequence, they usually
occupy concurrently all system cores across the entire period
of a website visit, which studies have shown that it is 1 minute
on average [70].
In Figure 8, we plot the total number of SHA-256 hashes
brute-forced by the 2 approaches in an infected browser for a
period of 12 hours. For MarioNet, we measure two cases: (i)
the best case, where the password cracker runs uninterruptedly
in the victim’s device, and (ii) the worst case, where along
with the malicious computations there is heavy utilization
from other processes too. In the second case, to simulate
this heavy load, we concurrently run a multi-threaded pi digit
calculator [90] that fully utilizes all 8 system’s cores. As
we can see, although web-botnet utilizes greedily 8× more
resources, MarioNet due to its persistence, enjoys a higher
efficiency after the 18th minute of an open browser, even under
extreme heavy concurrent interference. Consequently, while till
today, the business model of malicious websites were to deploy
a web-botnet and find a way to keep the user on the website (by
providing free movie streaming, online games or include pop-
under windows [87]), with MarioNet it takes only a momentary
visit to infect the user and take control of their browser.
VII. DEFENSES
In this section we examine potential defense mechanism
that could detect and mitigate MarioNet type of attacks. The
goal is to determine whether it is feasible to detect the general
methodology of the attack vectors that are opened through
the misuse of the service worker mechanisms, rather than
mitigating the specific use cases studied in this paper.
We present various defense strategies and discuss the
corresponding tradeoffs they bring. We categorize the defenses
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and previous Web-botnet approaches that utilize Web Workers,
in the lapse of time. The persistence of MarioNet makes a
single infected browser compute hashes as long as the browser
is open and thus be more efficient than opportunistic Web-
Botnets.
in two classes: (i) those that can be deployed inside a vanilla
browser (via the extensions/plugin mechanisms they support),
and (ii) those that can be deployed in the host (through
anti-virus tools, IDS/IPS, firewalls, etc.) or by modifying the
browser.
A. In-browser Mechanisms
1) Restricting Service Workers: Service workers have been
introduced to enable rich offline experiences, periodic back-
ground synchronization, and push notifications among others.
Traditionally such functionality was normally requiring a na-
tive application. However, the window of opportunity that open
for attackers should make questionable the tradeoff between
rich user experience and security.
In the case of MarioNet, disabling service workers could in-
deed prevent the persistence and stealthiness of in-browser ma-
licious computations. However the capabilities service workers
have, and the demand for such functionalities, would make
such a proposition inapplicable. It would be feasible though
to selectively enable service workers only for some “trusted”
websites, possibly via a browser extension that prevents/blocks
registration of service workers at first place.
Another option would be to restrict their liveness, and be
proportionate to the user presence in the website that hosts
them (i.e., the service worker will be suspended after the user
leaves the website) or apply a time cap (i.e., service worker
gets terminated if it keeps running for an unreasonable amount
of time). By doing so, the persistence characteristic of our
attack will no longer be available. The service workers will
still be able to intercept and modify navigation and resource
requests, as well as cache resources, using the storage API for
example, to allow applications to run even when the network is
not available. However, service worker API is designed to pro-
vide important functionality to long-running web applications
(e.g., Google Docs, email), allowing them to have rich offline
experience. By forcing restrictions, service workers will not
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be able to provide background synchronization (e.g., update
the caches even when the user is not at the site) or provide
push messages and notifications. Still though, a malicious actor
could still be able to utilize them in order to increase the
stealthiness and evade detection by traditional security browser
extensions—i.e., a malicious computation taking place inside
a service worker will be more difficult to be detected.
A step towards striking stealthiness is to disable the
eval() family functions. By doing so, the attacker would
need to ship the malicious functionalities together with the ser-
vice worker, which would facilitate the signature-based content
filtering browser extensions to detect them easier. Obviously,
this would be an arm race between attackers and defenders,
given the obfuscation and code scrambling techniques that
are in use for similar cases. In addition, service workers can
include minimal ISA emulators in order to execute malicious
instructions received from the attacker. A more aggressive
option would be to limit the functionality offered by service
workers, by making only a subset of JavaScript available for
use (e.g., allowing only the sending/receiving of data between
the website and the web server). Clearly, such a data-driven
approach would require much more careful consideration and
design.
2) Whitelists/Blacklists: Another possible defense strategy
is to restrict the browser, with fine-grained policies, from
fetching and deploying service workers. The simplest approach
is the use of whitelists; i.e., service workers will be blocked,
unless the domain of origin is whitelisted. These lists can
initially include popular sites, which are typically considered
more trusted, and enriched by web crawling and analysis
platforms, such as [77], that perform web-wide analysis to
detect malicious websites and JavaScript files.
3) Click to Activate: Another mitigation would be to re-
quire the user’s permission for registration and activation of a
service worker—similar to “Click to Play” mechanism [69]
that disables by default plug-ins, such as Flash, Java, Sil-
verlight and others. By doing so, the service worker functional-
ity will be disabled by default, and users would need to explic-
itly give permission for the service worker to run. Currently,
this user consent is needed only for the Push Notifications [66].
However, given the variation of attack vectors that can be
achieved through a malicious service worker, we believe that
explicit permission would raise user suspicion—in the same
way it does for location, microphone, etc.—especially when
browsing unreliable websites. One may say that these proposed
permission-based defences may be not practical to constitute
the perfect mitigation for the presented attack. However, recent
developments such as GDPR, mobile or browser permissions
model, etc. have demonstrated that user consent can be forced.
B. Host-based Approaches
1) Signature-based Detection: Traditional tools—such as
firewalls, anti-virus, intrusion detection/prevention systems—
are always a prominent methodology for the detection of
malicious activities. The majority of these tools are typically
using signatures to detect suspicious data and/or code that
enter or leave the user’s computer. The creation of such
signatures for the case of MarioNet may be trivial for some
attack cases. For example, it could be easy to detect MarioNet
messages that are exchanged between the service worker that
lies in the browser and the back-end server, by monitoring
the network traffic. A sophisticated attacker can obviously
employ several techniques to raise the bar against signature-
based detection mechanisms. For example, by installing end-
to-end encryption with the back-end server can sufficiently
hide the content of the messages. Given that a host-based
approach can have full control of the client side though, the
SSL connection can be intercepted to acquire the decrypted
data. Besides, the messages still need to be transferred, which
can be a good hint for detection mechanisms that are based
on network flow statistics (e.g., number of packets exchanged,
packet size). Even though covert channels and steganography
may potentially help attackers, there are works that try to
detect web-based botnets, by performing anomaly detection on
features like communication patterns and payload size [46].
2) Behavioral Analysis and Anomaly Detection: A more
drastic solution would be to develop techniques that try to
detect suspicious behavior of JavaScript programs that are
embedded in the web site or the service worker. Obviously,
this would require more sophisticated analysis than simple
fixed string searching and regular expression matching, due
to the fact that the obfuscation of the malicious JavaScript
code snippets can evade static analysis techniques. Instead,
more advanced and complex analyzers should be used, such
as the monitoring of the utilized resources or the behavioral
analysis of the executed code. Even though this can be quite
challenging, several works have been proposed in the past [40],
[78], [42]. For instance, one of the first anomaly detection
approaches is JaSPIn [78], which creates a profile of the appli-
cation usage of JavaScript and enforces it later. IceShield [42]
uses a linear decision function that differentiates malicious
code from normal code based on heuristics for several attack
types that apply code obfuscation. Finally, in [40] the authors
audit the execution of JavaScript code, and compare it to
high-level policies, in order to detect malicious code behavior.
Although all these approaches are not trivial, they are a
prominent step towards protecting against malicious JavaScript
programs in general.
VIII. DISCUSSION
Ethical considerations. In this paper, we implemented and
deployed MarioNet in a strictly controlled environment. Dur-
ing our experimentation with attack scenarios, no user or web
server outside this controlled environment were contacted or
harmed in any way. As such, we constrained the evaluation of
our system to a limited set of nodes, thus avoiding any attempt
to measure our system on a larger scale, in the real world.
Registration of multiple service workers. Service workers
are associated with specific scopes during registration and each
service worker can only control pages that fall under its scope.
If more than one service workers are registered (while the user
is navigating throughout a website), then the browser enables
only the service worker with the broader scope (typically the
service worker registered at the root domain). However, during
our experimentation we observed that a publisher can design
its website on purpose so that multiple service workers can
be registered in non-overlapping scopes (i.e., in file paths at
the same level of the URI). As a consequence, this allows
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MarioNet to have multiple Servants simultaneously active and
utilize them for running its malicious tasks in multiple threads.
Cross-origin service workers. The cross-origin service
worker (or foreign-fetch [76]) is an experimental feature of
Chrome 54, to enable registration of third-party service work-
ers. The motivation behind that, is to enable developers to im-
plement advanced functionalities, such as client-side caching
of CDN-based third party content. However, this feature broad-
ens the threat model of MarioNet-like approaches, enabling
third-parties to misuse the service workers of the domains that
include them. Even though this feature was discontinued one
year after its announcement [85], mostly due to applicability
issues, it still shows that such new functionalities should be
considered carefully in terms of security, before being applied.
Towards this direction, the aim of this work is to increase
the awareness of developers and browser vendors regarding the
provided powerful (but also potentially risky) capabilities of
modern HTML. This way, restricting policies will adequately
secure the user-side environments of future web applications.
IX. RELATED WORK
Web browsers are a core part of our everyday life, being
the door to the gigantic world of the web. As a result, they
have become a valuable target for attackers, that try to exploit
them in many different ways.
For instance, several approaches try to abuse the rich
features of modern web applications, in order to form web-
based botnets, the existence of which has seen a significant
rise recently [50]. Provos et al. [77] present the threat of web-
based malware infections, in which the infected browsers pull
commands from a server controlled by the attacker. Contrary
to traditional botnet-like attacks, web-based malware does not
spread via remote exploitation but rather via web-based infec-
tion. In [15], the authors craft malicious webpages where users
get infected upon visit. The attackers can then abuse users’
browsers to perform attacks like DDoS, worm propagation, and
node reconnaissance. Grossmann and Johansen [47] leverage
ads to deliver malicious JavaScript to users, forcing browsers
to establish connections with a victim server, thus performing
a DoS attack. A major limitation of these approaches though,
is that the corresponding malicious JavaScript snippets need to
be embedded in the main webpage. As a result, long-running
operations would block the rendering procedure and execution
of the web application, making it practical only for short-lived
attacks.
To overcome this limitation, many approaches started re-
cently to use web workers—a feature that was introduced
with HTML5. Web workers run as separate threads, and thus
being isolated from the page’s window. This allows the parallel
execution of operations, without affecting the normal rendering
of the web application, leading to the rise of more advanced
web-based botnets. Kuppan [51] demonstrate this ability of
using web workers to perform DDoS attacks. Rushanan et al.
in [79], also use web workers to perform stealthy computations
on the user side and launch not only attacks like DoS and
resource depletion but also covert channel using CPU and
memory throttling. Pellegrino et al. [74] also present different
techniques to orchestrate web-based DoS attacks, by utilizing
web workers among other HTML5 features, and provide
an economic analysis and costs of browser-based botnets.
Similarly, Pan et al. [71] explore the possibility of using
web workers for performing application-layer DDoS attacks,
cryptocurrency mining and password cracking. Their results
show that although DDoS attacks and password cracking are
feasible and with comparable financial cost, cryptocurrency
mining is not profitable for the attacker given the limited time
a user spends in a website. Dorsey presented an in-browser
botnet using web workers as well [25]. The user browser, after
infection, participates in a swarm of bots performing various
malicious operations like DDoS attacks, torrent sharing, cryp-
tocurrency mining, and distributed hash cracking. To infect as
many users as possible, Dorsey embedded his malware in a
malicious advertisement and let the ad network to distribute
it to the users browsers. Similar to MarioNet, all the above
approaches do not require any software installation on the
user side. However, the browser remains under the control of
the attacker only for the duration that the user is browsing
the malicious website, making it impractical for long-running
botnet operations. Instead, MarioNet provides persistence that
allows the attacker to perform malicious computations for a
period longer than a website visit.
Besides the crypto-mining and crypto-jacking attacks, in
which a website unintentionally hosts web-mining code snip-
pets [58], [53], there are publishers that intentionally use
mining to monetize their websites. Eskandari et al. analyze
the existing in-browser mining approaches and their prof-
itability [27]. Similar to web-based botnets, in-browser miners
maintain a connection with a remote server to obtain PoW
tasks and abuse web workers to achieve the highest possible
CPU utilization on the user side. However, the short website
visiting times make the profitability of this approach ques-
tionable [82]. MarioNet also uses crypto-jacking as a possible
scenario, however instead of web workers we leverage service
workers to enable an entity to gain much higher profits due to
the provided persistence.
Finally, several attacks are based on malicious browser ex-
tensions that a user downloads and deploys in the browser [55],
[75]. For instance, Liu et al. propose a botnet framework
that exploits the browser extension update mechanism to
issue batch commands [55]. By doing so, they are able to
perform DDoS attacks, spam emails and passwords sniffing.
Similarly, Perrotta et al. exploit the over-privileged capabilities
of browser extensions to check the effectiveness of botnet
attacks in contemporary desktop and mobile browsers [75].
Their results show that different attacks are feasible in different
browsers. A major difference of these approaches with Mari-
oNet, is that all the above approaches require the installation
of software (i.e., browser extension) on the user side.
X. CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented MarioNet: a novel multi-
attack framework to allow persistent and stealthy bot opera-
tion through web browsers. Contrary to traditional botnet-like
approaches, our framework does not require any installation
of malicious software on the user side. Instead, it leverages
the existing technologies and capabilities provided by HTML5
APIs of contemporary browsers.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of this system by de-
signing a large set of attack scenarios where the user’s system
13
resources are abused to perform malicious actions including
DDoS attacks to remote targets, cryptojacking, malicious/ille-
gal data hosting, and darknet deployment. Two important char-
acteristics of MarioNet, that further highlight the severity of
the aforementioned attacks, is that it provides persistence, thus
allowing an attacker to continue their malicious computation
even after the user navigates away from the malicious website.
In addition, MarioNet provides evasiveness, performing all
operations in a completely stealthy way, thus bypassing the
existing in-browser detection mechanisms.
Essentially, our work demonstrates that the trust model of
web, which considers web publishers as trusted and allows
them to execute code on the client-side without any restric-
tions is flawed and needs reconsideration. Furthermore, this
work aims to increase the awareness regarding the powerful
capabilities that modern browser APIs provide to attackers, and
to initiate a serious discussion about implementing restrictions
while offering such capabilities that can be easily abused.
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